CHIEF Minister Datuk Seri Hajiji Noor may have inadvertently ignited a political debate with his recent statement dismissing the notion of a “Borneo Bloc,” a remark that some have interpreted as downplaying the longstanding claims that Sabah and Sarawak are “equal partners” in the Malaysian federation.
Hajiji’s remarks are significant because they highlight persistent ambiguities surrounding the interpretation of the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63) and the meaning often attached to the phrase “equal partners.” Since 1963, this phrase has frequently appeared in the political lexicon of Sabah and Sarawak, shaping public expectations about their place within the federation.
Hajiji’s no “Borneo Bloc” comment needs elaboration in the context of history. As he noted, “We are one country, and there must be cooperation between all parties, the states and the federal government to further strengthen Malaysia.” In principle, this statement reflects the logic of a federal system, where cooperation between different levels of government is necessary for the functioning of the state.
As a recently appointed member of the National Unity Advisory Council for the 2025–2027 term, I have received numerous calls asking for my views on the matter, and this article reflects my personal perspective on the issue.
Need to differentiate Borneo bloc and Equal partners
At the outset, it is important to distinguish between two different concepts that are conflated in public debate: the idea of a “Borneo Bloc” and the notion of “equal partners.”
The term “Borneo Bloc” refers to a political strategy that has occasionally surfaced during election campaigns, calling for Sabah and Sarawak to coordinate politically on common demands e.g. the demand for 35% parliamentary seats.
In contrast, the concept of “equal partners” refers to a different interpretation of Malaysia’s founding arrangement, one with the view of Putrajaya, Sabah, and Sarawak as the three remaining entities of the original Malaysia Agreement 1963 in a tripartite configuration of equal standing. Among the group that signed MA63, the united Kingdom has washed their hands over Malaysia, and Singapore left in 1965.
The Borneo bloc is not a new idea. it was mooted as a post war “Grand Design” by the British Colonial Office, combining North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei as a single unit and merging with Malaya and Singapore, under a single Constitution (Stockwell, 2004).
Equal partnership, however, does not align with the classical structure of a federal system. Federalism typically involves a constitutional division of powers between a central authority and constituent states, rather than a tripartite partnership among co-equal entities.
While all are constituent units of the federation of Malaysia, the constitutional framework does not treat the Borneo states on par with the central government.
Understanding this distinction is crucial if the ongoing debate about the status of Sabah and Sarawak within Malaysia is to be conducted with historical clarity.
Equal partners lacks legal definition
In the closing chapter of my book “Revisiting the Social Contract”, I emphasised that the term “equal partners” requires a clear legal definition. Constitutional scholars such as Shad Saleem Faruqi (2021) and Andrew Harding (2021) agree on a crucial constitutional point: when Sabah and Sarawak joined the federation in 1963 to form Malaysia, they were granted a range of additional constitutional powers and safeguards not enjoyed by the other eleven states.
This arrangement means that the states of Peninsular Malaysia, together with Sabah and Sarawak, exist within an asymmetrical relationship with the federal government.
Some of the special provisions given to Sabah are immigration control, freedom of religion, the use of English language, 40% tax revenue sharing, and native rights.
Looking back at the historical record, the formation of Malaysia was marked by a number of ambiguities that have continued to generate confusion about the nature of the federation. One of the earliest and most important forums addressing the proposed federation was the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee (MSCC), established in 1961, chaired by Tun Fuad Stephens.
The committee brought together prominent political leaders from Malaya, Singapore, and North Borneo (Sabah), while representatives from Brunei participated as observers. Its principal task was to assess and promote the viability of the proposed Federation of Malaysia and to persuade the peoples of the region that the project represented a practical and beneficial political arrangement.
Significantly, the deliberations of the MSCC revealed a shared understanding among the participating delegations that any new federation must preserve the identity and autonomy of its constituent territories.
The possibility of Malaysia being constituted as a unitary state was never seriously contemplated. Instead, the discussions reflected a clear expectation that the component states would retain substantial autonomy within a federal framework.
Cobbold Commission Conclusions
As Lord Cobbold commented in his conclusions to the Commission’s report, “It is a necessary condition that, from the outset, Malaysia should be regarded by all concerned as an association of partners, combining in the common interest to create a new nation but retaining their own individualities.
But, given the strength of those individualities, perhaps the most that could be expected of Malaysia was a federation of nations rather than a nation-state.
By setting out at length and in detail the provisions for federal and state institutions, citizenship, legislative powers, administrative arrangements, financial and public services, the protection of the special interests of the Borneo states and Singapore, and temporary arrangements covering a transitional period for the Borneo states and Singapore, the Malaysia agreement of July 1963 allocated powers and apportioned responsibilities, acknowledged majority interests and safeguarded minority rights.
In short, the constitution of Malaysia was an elaborate set of contracts concluded after prolonged and elaborate multi-lateral negotiations. It may subsequently have disappointed many, provoked active opposition in some quarters and been breached later by its very guardians”. (Stockwell, 2004. pg.lxx)
The negotiations that culminated in the Malaysia Agreement 1963 were therefore both complex and carefully structured. The agreement, signed in July 1963, set out in considerable detail the constitutional architecture of the new federation.
It defined the structure of federal and state institutions, established provisions for citizenship, delineated legislative and administrative powers, and outlined financial arrangements and the organisation of public services.
Equally important were the safeguards incorporated to protect the special interests of the Borneo territories, as well as Singapore, including transitional arrangements designed to ease their integration into the federation. In effect, the constitutional framework of Malaysia represented an elaborate set of negotiated understandings that balanced majority interests with minority protections.
These bit of history made it clear that, in the early stages of discussions, the idea of Sabah and Sarawak merely becoming extensions of the Federation of Malaya was not in the works. Rather, the negotiations envisioned a new federation formed through partnership, in which the Borneo territories would enter as distinct political entities with recognised autonomy and constitutional safeguards.
In summary, the original British “Grand Design” of Malaysia envisioned a form of political amalgamation, fundamentally different from the realities experienced today.
This founding vision has increasingly diverged from contemporary practice. It has evolved toward a far more centralised structure, characterised by strong federal control and the gradual erosion of state autonomy.
The gradual erosion of state rights
In the case of Sabah, many of the rights and safeguards originally envisaged during the formation of Malaysia have been progressively diluted, often through shifting political narratives, reinterpretations of constitutional arrangements, and the consolidation of power by the central government. As a result, the present political reality stands in marked contrast to the spirit of MA63 that underpinned the original design of the federation.
Today, Sabah and Sarawak are in category b) of the Federal Constitution, a restored status after amendments to Article 1 (2) in 2021, once again confirming their special status, apart from the eleven states of Malaya. Successive Prime Ministers of Malaysia has reaffirmed Sabah and Sarawak as equal partners (in name), special regions, or “Wilayah” within Malaysia; again, without legal definition.
For most of the time Sabah and Sarawak were “fixed deposits” under the Umno BN regime.
Borrowing the words of Advocates and Solicitor Tengku Fuad, “Equal Partners” is an “inspairisi”, not necessary a reality.
Dr Johan is a Member of the National Unity Advisory Council. This is his personal view.
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