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Few federations have been launched under circumstances which seemed more ominous than those surrounding the formation of the Federation of Malaysia – so writes Assoc. Professor of Political Science, MacMaster University, Ontario, Gordon P. Means, with perhaps more hindsight than insight bearing in mind the article, “Eastern Malaysia: The Politics of Federation” was written in 1968, after the separation of Singapore from the federation and the turbulent period of the tussle for ascendancy in politics in both Sabah and Sarawak from 1965 to 1966.

More than 60 years on, it seems that time has vindicated the good professor in his assessment of the circumstances under which the federation was drawn forth. The fragile alliance that governed the state which the colonial power had entrusted the future well-being of the nation with its diversity in race and culture, has been displaced by a single race-dominated coalition with overtly unapologetic racist agendas.

Not only were circumstances in the early sixties unusual to say the least, but the political amalgamation of two politically immature states to a  politically unstable state by a colonial power with the connivance of that unstable but more politically mature state is politically and ethically questionable. 

Added to that, the time frame within which the idea was hatched, negotiations concluded and the agreement signed, was itself evidence of collusion at the highest levels. 

By a stroke of the pen the peoples of Sarawak and North Borneo were forced into an incompatible union to be dominated by politicians, some of who would use and abuse their powers for the next sixty years.

Another Commentator, George Kahin wrote, ‘Malaysia is the [result of] the marriage between Malay feudalism and British Imperialism’ (Malaysia and Indonesia, George McT Kahin, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 37, August, 1964.) He continued; 

“Sarawak and Sabah were never offered the alternative of independence, either as separate entities or within a Borneo federation.’ 

The compromises that were made to realize the union were forced, and subsequently hastily grafted into a constitution that had been drafted to suit the dominant state with its racial mix without much regard to the addition of diverse groups of native races from the two territories.   

All this arguably contributed to much of the future problems and general malaise of this federation that was hastily cobbled together by the British and Malayan factions with compromises. What had caused the British lion to retreat with its tail between its legs, forsaking its responsibilities to the peoples of the colonies that had shed their blood and endured hardship for the mother country in the two world wars?

Two World Wars had put an end to the British dream of maintaining an empire “on which the sun never sets” . After the defeat of Germany, the reality of the cost of the war financially, demographically and morally shattered the illusion of invincibility. As Philip Stephens puts it, in ‘Britain Alone The Path from Suez to Brexit  (London: Faber and Faber, 2021): “The defeat of Hitler had also marked the end of the Pax Britanica.” 

Britain having been hollowed out economically by the Great War of 1914, in which she had, arguably foolishly embroiled itself instead of leaving the quarrelsome European nation states to sort out themselves, was ill equipped to engage in another war. The Second World War further deflated the hope of ever resuscitating the empire.

The post-war Labour Government of Clement Atlee, having given in to pressure to grant independence to India in 1947,  signaled its lofty intention to set free other colonies in a White paper in June 1948: 

“The central purpose of the British colonial policy ….is to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth in conditions that ensure to the people concerned both a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression in any quarter.”

Atlee’s socialist government had set about to uplift the living standards of Britons, and had put in place the national health care program that would prove to be its greatest achievement, but with Truman’s abrupt cancellation of the Lend-Lease program, it found American creditors baying at the door.

The great economist, John Maynard Keynes though old and sickly had to be dispatched post haste, to the States to negotiate for a fresh loan to tide the country over.

The Labour government, understandably, did not survive the next election to abide by its noble intentions. The Conservatives led by Winston Churchill was returned to power in 1951. 

Churchill during his second term (1951-1955) tried to maintain that illusion, and hold on to the remnants of the empire.

Despite his disastrous handling of the Bengal famine during the war, Churchill appeared to possess the old Conservative paternalism toward the native peoples in the colonies.  

In a conversation with Richard Nixon who was at the time the Vice President of USA, Churchill, in response to Nixon’s praise for easing the transition of British colonies to independence, expressed his reservation: “I only hope we didn’t give them their independence before they were ready to assume the responsibilities of government.”

It may be noted that it was during the Conservative government of Churchill that an Order in Council was made by Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II on 24thJune, 1954 to extend the boundaries of the Colony of Sarawak to include the Continental Shelf contiguous to the territorial waters of the state.  

Though expressed to be the act of the Queen, it was the Churchill Cabinet that had made the decision and formulated the order. 

Pursuant to the Order, the Sarawak Oil Mining Ordinance was passed by the colonial administration to grant power to the Governor in Council to, among other things, grant oil prospecting and exploration licences including mining leases, over the said area.

The Order in Council was made following the Truman Declaration of September, 1945, whereby the United States declared that the natural resources of the subsoil and the sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coast of the United States to be subject to its jurisdiction and control. There was, therefore, no reason to doubt that the government under Anthony Eden would not have continued with the policies of the Churchill government in respect to the colonies, in particular, their natural resources. 

Indeed, after the Pacific War there was an idea to create a self-governing British dominion of Southeast Asia, comprising Malaya, the Straits Settlements and the Borneo territories.

It is also important to bear in mind that the presence of oil in the continental shelf off Sarawak was known to the British as far back as 1954. 

The question, the elephant in the room so to speak, is why was this never discussed in the negotiations between the British and Malayan members of the Cobbold Commission?

There is no question the presence of oil was known to all, except perhaps to the Sarawak representatives. Ghazali Shafie in his memoir of the formation of Malaysia says on p135:

“Datu Mustapha told me that North Borneo was about to find oil and even brought something to show me as a sample in a jar of what might be the black gold. Since I was ignorant of any knowledge about mineral oil I was not able to confirm one way or another as to the personal oil riches of North Borneo.”

There is also no doubt the Tunku knew of the presence of oil in the Borneo states. It was one of the main issues that was raised in his negotiation with the Sultan on the terms of joining the federation.

The question of what would happen to the revenue from the existing oil fields and from new discoveries in Brunei after a period of 10 years was a sticking point in the negotiations. The Sultan’s legal advisor and negotiator was Neil Lawson, QC.

In his conversations with the Tunku (Marshall Cavendish, 2016), Tan Sri Abdullah Ahmad asked the Tunku why Brunei did not join Malaysia. This is what the Tunku said:

“The British were keen for Brunei to join us…the fact of the matter was that the sultan of Brunei was threatened by Shell. God knows with what, but it was enough to make him change his words to me” (p49)

In 1955, Churchill reluctantly passed on the baton to Anthony Eden, his Foreign Secretary, who had been waiting impatiently in the wings. 

Only 55 when he succeeded Churchill as Prime Minister, Anthony Eden was eminently suited to move into Number 10 and to stay for a term or two. He won the next election easily with a huge majority and would have consolidated British interests in the Middle East had his term not been cut short by the Suez Crisis. And there were plans for the upkeep of the colonies.

A Cabinet paper, “The Future of the United Kingdom in World Affairs,” had recommended a review of the defence commitments in the Middle and Far East, but did not think that independence for any of the colonies should be expedited: “the Colonial Office argued that more rapid independence for colonies would play into the hands of communists and ‘extreme nationalists’, and jeopardize the evolution of the Commonwealth”. (G.C. Peden, “Suez and Britain’s Decline as a World Power,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 55, Dec. 2012) 

In the paper, the author argues that Suez was no more than ‘a flash of lightning, an eddy in the fast-flowing stream of history’, that the acceleration of decolonization in Africa did not begin until 1959 and that the turn from commonwealth to Europe was a long-drawn process rather than the result of a single event. He noted that Whitehall was already well aware that Britain’s world role was dependent on American support, and had considered Suez to be no more than ‘a flash of lightning on a dark night’.

However, it was Suez that hastened the exit of Eden from No.10. 

It was ironic that Eden, who had been in the House of Commons for thirty one years and had served three governments as foreign secretary should have fumbled on Suez.  

He knew Persian and Arabic, but had no empathy with the peoples that spoke those languages. It was a greater irony that he should have been the one and only British statesman to be featured on an Egyptian postage stamp. But the nub of it was that he hated Nasser, whom he compared to Mussolini.

Thirty-six year old Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser had taken part in the military coup in 1952 led by General Mohammad Neguib that ended the corrupt rule of  King Farouk of Egypt in 1952. Serving first as prime minister, he later deposed General Neguib and became President in 1956. 

David is a Miri-based lawyer

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